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FEDERAL COURTS' CONTROL OF IfJ.GAL CONDUCT
OF STATE OFFICERS WHO AID IN ENFORCEMENT
OF FEDERAL LAW
The defendants were arrested by a state law enforcement officer.
After placing the defendants in custody, the officer made an illegal
search of their car and seized incriminating evidence. The evidence
and the defendants were then turned over to federal authorities for
federal criminal prosecution.'
An accused in such a case is clearly a victim of illegal conduct
by state officers. He desires to rely on this conduct to exclude the
evidence which has been illegally obtained; yet he is faced with the
fact that federal courts do not consider a state officer, not acting in
concert with federal authorities, an agent of the federal government,
but rather a "stranger ' ' 2 to the proceedings over whom they have no
direct control. This Note will attempt to determine under what
conditions federal courts will and should indirectly control the con-
duct of state officers by excluding evidence or granting an acquittal.
The discussion will be limited to the acts of illegal search and seizure,
unreasonable detention, and entrapment, which constitute the ma-
jority of illegal police conduct. The extent to which federal courts
will and should control these acts of state police will be determined
by an examination of the manner in which the law has developed
in these areas, an analysis of the distinctions which have been drawn,
and a presentation of a number of important considerations essen-
tial to any sound solution of the problem.
SEARCH AND SEIZURn
Evidence obtained by state officers in a search and seizure which
would have been illegal by federal standards will nevertheless be ad-
mitted into a federal court if there is no evidence of federal partici-
pation or instigation.8 The rationale for this exception to the federal
exclusionary rule is somewhat formalistic. It is founded on the as-
sumption that the federal exclusionary rule is a command of the
fourth amendment which does not apply to the states.4 Since an
unreasonable search and seizure by a state officer does not violate
the fourth amendment, the evidence obtained is not subject to the
federal exclusionary rule.5
1. Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 921 (1955).
2. See United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156, 158 (7th Cir. 1953).
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (dictum).
4. See, e.g., Wheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599, 601 (4th Cir.
1946).
5. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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This exception appears to sit uncomfortably with the principles
which support the general rule of exclusion in federal courts. It
encourages police lawlessness by prompting federal officers to em-
ploy state officers to make illegal search and seizures so that the
federal exclusionary rule may be circumvented. 6 It places the bur-
den on the accused to prove the actual agreement or persuade the
court to draw an inference of collaboration from the facts.7 These
results can be neither justified nor condemned without an examina-
tion of the origin, use, and modification of this exception to the
federal exclusionary rule.
Initially, this exception was formulated in Weeks v. United
States.8 The Supreme Court said that evidence obtained by state
officers in an illegal search and seizure would not be excluded be-
cause:
It does not appear that they [state officers] acted under any
claim of Federal authority such as would make the Amendment
[fourth] applicable to such unauthorized seizures.... What rem-
edies the defendant may have against them we need not inquire
as the Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual miscon-
duct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal Govern-
ment and its agencies.
This broad language was soon restricted by the court of appeals
in Flagg v. United States.'0 The court found that the illegal search
and seizure had been instigated by federal officers because:
[T]o attribute such an elaborate and carefully prepared pro-
ceeding as was planned to convict the defendant, to a few local
patrolmen or to some unknown parties ... makes too severe a
demand upon the imagination."
The usefulness of the Flagg case in controlling police illegality
was short-lived. In 1921, the Supreme Court in Burdeau v. McDow-
eli'2 held that the federal government could use evidence which had
been illegally obtained by private individuals. Subsequently, the fed-
6. For recent discussion of the dangers inherent in this qualification see
Machen, The Lav of Search and Seizure 125-27 (1950); Alien, The Wolf
Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 I1. L. Rev.
1, 23 (1950). See generally Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search
and Seizure, 58 Yale L. J. 144 (1948).
7. The present test for federal participation is the so-called "silver
platter" test announced by Justice Frankfurter in Lustig v. United States.
Spealdng for the majority, he stated that "the crux of that doctrine is that
a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a
search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned
over to the federal authorities on a silver platter." 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949).
8. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
9. Id. at 398.
10. 233 Fed. 481 (2d Cir. 1916).
11. Id. at 483; accord, United States v. Bush, 269 Fed. 455 (D.C. N.Y.
1920).
12. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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eral courts began to consider state officers as "private individuals"
and admit evidence which had been illegally obtained by these officers
without a great deal of concern over the degree of cooperation be-
tween federal and state officers.13 This result was no doubt due to
the courts' desire to aid federal officers in their increasingly difficult
task of enforcing the federal prohibition laws.
However, the abuses of dispensing with an accurate determina-
tion of federal participation for the sake of enforcing the National
Prohibition Act soon became apparent.'" The Supreme Court sought
to remedy the situation in Byars v. United States,15 and Gambino v.
United States.'6 The Court held in the Byars case that the mere
presence of a federal officer during the act was sufficient participa-
tion. This rule was broadened in Gam bino, where the Court excluded
evidence obtained by state police in an illegal search for liquor even
though federal officers had not participated in the act. The Court
reasoned that the state police were acting "solely on behalf of the
United States" in the enforcement of its law because no violation
of a state law was involved.
The immediate response of the lower federal courts to the Gam-
bino case was to limit it to its facts' 7 or to utilize the law of arrest 8
to restrict the broad scope which the Supreme Court had given to
13. For an apparent classification of a state officer as a private individual,
see United States v. Viess, 273 Fed. 279, 282 n.1 (D.C. Wash. 1921). As to
lack of concern over federal-state cooperation, see, e.g., Park v. United States,
294 Fed. 776 (1st Cir. 1924) ; Timonen v. United States, 286 Fed. 935 (6th
Cir. 1923). But see In re Schuetze, 299 Fed. 827 (D.C. N.Y. 1924) ; United
States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75 (D.C. Mo. 1922).
14. See Brown v. United States, 12 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1926), in which
federal agents instructed city police to make the search, accompanied them
to the scene, and entered after the evidence was seized. Yet the court held that
the federal officers "took no part in the search and the search was not made
under their authority." Ibid. In Schroeder v. United States, 7 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.
1925), although there was no state prohibition law in force, the court refused
to find collaboration where a city policeman illegally seized liquor and turned
it over to federal authorities.
15. 273 U.S. 28 (1927). See Comment, 36 Yale L.J. 988 (1927), for a
discussion of the situation which the Court in Byars sought to correct
16. 275 U.S. 310 (1927), 12 Minn. L. Rev. 424 (1928). It is interesting
to note that the dissent in Kanellos v. United States, 282 Fed. 461, 464 (4th
Cir. 1922), may have anticipated the result in Gambino.
17. See United States v. Blanco, 27 F.2d 375 (D.C. Tex. 1928).
18. Immediately after the decision, the federal courts resorted to state
law to justify an arrest by a state officer for possession of liquor. If the federal
court could find that the state officer made the arrest for a violation of a
state statute or municipal ordinance such as a traffic regulation, any evidence
discovered by a subsequent search and seizure without a warrant would be
admitted into federal court because it was obtained pursuant to a "valid
arrest" See March v. United States, 29 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1928), in which
the justification for the search and seizure by state officers was an alleged
failure to stop for a traffic light See also United States v. Jankowski, 28
F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1928), in which a defective headlight provided grounds
for a "valid arrest" and subsequent search by state officers.
1957]
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the fourth and fifth amendments. However, the lower federal courts
soon became willing to find federal-state collaboration without sub-
stantial proof. This attitude prevailed for a short time after the re-
peal of the prohibition law when the courts excluded evidence on
the slightest showing of federal participation.19 Then the lower fed-
eral courts gradually reverted to the point where they would not
exclude evidence without substantial proof of federal participation.20
In 1949 the Supreme Court cast doubt upon the validity of ad-
mitting into a federal court evidence which had been illegally obtained
by state officers. The Court in Wolf v. Colorado2 was concerned
with whether or not the fourteenth amendment required exclusion
of evidence in a state court which had been illegally obtained by
state officers. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment did not
command exclusion. Important for the purpose of examining the
distinction drawn between state and federal officers, is the concur-
ring opinion, which interpreted language used by the majority to
mean that:
[T] he federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth
Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate. 22
If this were in fact the position of the majority, then the founda-
tion of the argument for admitting into federal courts evidence
which has been illegally obtained by state officers would be destroyed.
Heretofore the federal exclusionary rule has been restricted to those
search and seizures in which there was some evidence of federal par-
ticipation because it has been assumed that the source of the rule
was the fourth amendment which is limited to acts of the federal
government. 23 If the rule were to be severed from the fourth amend-
ment and allowed to exist apart as a judicially created and controlled
rule of evidence, it could be applied to exclude evidence obtained in
any illegal search and seizure.
No doubt the Court was aware of this important implication of
the Wolf case. In Lustig v. United States,24 decided the same day,
19. In Fowler v. United States, 62 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1932), the court
found collusion where local police had an agreement with federal authorities
that the United States would have the first opportunity to try all prohibition
violators if a sufficient amount of illegal liquor was involved. In Sutherland v.
United States, 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1937), the court held that "general
co-operation" was sufficient to sustain a finding of federal collaboration. But
see Rettich v. United States, 84 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1936).
20. See, e.g., Kitt v. United States, 132 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.'1942).
21. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See also Note, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 365 (1950).
22. 338 U.S. at 39.
23. See, e.g., Wheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599, 601 (4th Cir.
1946).
24. 338 U.S 74 (1949).
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the Court found federal participation whenever a federal officer "has
a hand in the search," but took care to add:
Where there is participation on the part of federal officers it is
not necessary to consider what would be the result if the search
had been conducted entirely by State officers . 2
However the concurring opinion, written by Justice Murphy, took
exception with the majority's decision to leave the question open
and stated:
In my opinion the important consideration is the presence of an
illegal search. Whether state or federal officials did the searching
is of no consequence to the defendant, and it should make no
difference to us.26
Although the concurring opinions in Wolf and Lustig provided
persuasive arguments for eliminating the exception to the exclusion-
ary rule, lower federal courts have not responded in this manner.
From 1949 to date, they have utilized the "hand in the search" test
of Lustig27 and have ignored the comments of Justice Murphy.
28
They have continued to consider the federal exclusionary rule to be
a command of the fourth amendment which cannot be used in a fed-
eral court to exclude evidence which has been illegally obtained by a
state officer acting without the aid of a federal officer. 29
UNREASONABLE DETENTION
Under federal law, an accused has the right to be taken before a
United States Commissioner and charged or dismissed within a
"reasonable" period after arrest.80 A confession obtained during an
"unreasonable" period of detention by federal officers will not be
admitted as evidence in a federal court if the government cannot
rebut the presumption of coercion.81 The power to refuse admission
of a confession is not derived from the Constitution, but is based on
25. Id. at 79.
26. Id. at 80.
27. See, e.g., Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
Symons v. United States, 178 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 985 (1950).
28. See United States v. Stirsman, 212 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1954).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1956);
Williams v. United States, 215 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1954).
30. Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"An officer making an arrest under a search warrant issued upon a com-
plaint or any person maling an arrest without. a warrant shall take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available
commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States... "
31. See United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 155 (7th Cir. 1955) ;
Patterson v. United States, 183 F2d 687 (5th Cir. 1950). But the accused
must show that the delay was unnecessary. Joseph v. United States, 239 F.2d
524 (5th Cir. 1957).
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the power of the Supreme Court to establish rules of evidence and
procedure for federal courts . 2 However, the federal courts will ad-
mit a confession of a federal crime obtained during an unreasonable
period of detention by state officers if there is no evidence of federal
participation. As in the case of illegal search and seizures, the key
to admissibility is the presence or absence of federal participation.
The Supreme Court established the rule as to admissibility of
confessions in McNabb v. United States.8 4 Although only federal
officers were involved in the unreasonably long detention, the Court
phrased its decision in language which could be applied to the ad-
missibility, in federal courts, of evidence so obtained by state officers.
It said that:
[T]o permit such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction
in the federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress
has enacted into law [the requirement of commitment without
unreasonable delay] .85
The Court was "not concerned with law enforcement practices ex-
cept insofar as courts themselves become instruments of law enforce-
ment."8 6
In Anderson v. United States37 decided the same day, the Court
was faced with a motion to exclude a confession which had been
obtained during an unreasonable period of detention by state officers.
Although the opinion said that both cases were "governed by the
same considerations," the Court did not base its refusal to admit the
confession as evidence on the broad policy statement made in
McNabb. Rather, it relied on the fact that:
There was a working arrangement between the federal officers
and the sheriff of Polk County which made possible the abuses
revealed by this record. Therefore, the fact that the federal
officers themselves were not formally guilty of illegal conduct
does not affect the admissibility of evidence which they secured
improperly through collaboration with state officers. 38
If the Court had refused to admit the confessions under the con-
siderations of the McNabb rule, it could have avoided the issue of
federal participation. However, the Court's citation of the Gambino
and Byars cases8 9 indicated that the distinction between federal and
32. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
33. See Brown v. United States, 228 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956) ; White v. United States, 200 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 999 (1953).
34. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
35. Id. at 345.
36. Id. at 347.
37. 318 U.S. 350 (1943).
38. Id. at 356.
39. Ibid.
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state officers in the area of illegal search and seizure had apparently
become so well-entrenched that the Court was unwilling to elimi-
nate that distinction in the admissibility of confessions. Apparently
the areas were too analogous to set up opposing results and thus
be forced to either collaterally overrule the distinction in search
and seizures or re-examine the entire problem at this time. Neither
alternative appeared feasible. 40
ENTRAPMENT
If the federal court finds that a state officer has illegally entrapped
the accused into committing a federal crime, it will grant an acquittal
without requiring proof of federal participation.
The effect on a federal criminal prosecution of entrapment
of the accused by a state officer had not been decided until the re-
cent case of Henderson v. United States.4 ' Henderson and others
were indicated for conspiring to violate the Internal Revenue Code
by distilling "moonshine" whiskey. His principle defense was that
he had been entrapped into committing the crime by a state liquor
control agent. The evidence showed that the agent, a deputy sheriff,
induced Henderson to operate the illegal distillery. The district
court denied the defense of entrapment as a charge to the jury on
the theory that Henderson could not deny participation in con-
spiracy, while at the same time claiming that he was entrapped
into participating in the conspiracy.
The Fifth Circuit reversed Henderson's conviction and re-
manded his case for a new trial on the ground that he should be
able to raise the defense of entrapment as to his acts apart from
the conspiracy. Then, on its own motion, the court, in seeking
"another reason, a sound reason which would justify the action
of the district court," raised the question of whether or not the
defense of entrapment was available to the accused in a federal
40. The lower federal courts have also continued to maintain the dis-
tinction between federal and state officers. See, e.g., White v. United States,
200 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 999 (1953) ; United States
v. Harris, 211 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 822 (1954). An ex-
planation for the reluctance of the lower federal courts to control the state
police in this area can only be based on speculation. Some weight must be
given to the fact that the Supreme Court has never questioned the Anderson
decision. Also important, aside from the factors which influenced the Ander-
son decision, is the fact that the federal courts have failed to reach a uniform
agreement as to the rules that should govern the admissibility of any
confession. See Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree,
6 Stan. L. Rev. 411 (1954) ; Inbau, The Confession Dilemna in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 442 (1948). Federal courts, including
the Supreme Court, are no doubt unwilling to extend it to state officers while
it provides only an uncertain standard for federal officers.
41. 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
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criminal prosecution when the entrapment was by a state officer.
The question was one of first impression. 2
Historically, in the area of entrapment, the federal courts have
not been concerned with the distinction between state and federal
officers, but between "officers of the goverment" and private indi-
viduals.43 It appears well settled that an accused in a federal criminal
prosecution cannot raise the defense of entrapment when he has been
induced into committing the crime by a private individual.4 4 The
rationale is that the doctrine of entrapment was meant to operate
as a check on the enforcement power of the government, and to
extend it to acts of a private individual would serve no useful pur-
pose. Polski v. United States, the leading case in point, states that,
"the very heart of the doctrine is that 'the government itself has
brought about the crime." 45 If, however, the defendant could estab-
lish that the private individual was an agent of the federal govern-
ment, the defense of entrapment could be used.46
It was in this setting that the Fifth Circuit in Henderson recog-
nized that state officers were not agents of the federal government-
at least not in the sense in which that term had been used in prior
decisions. Quite logically, it could have then classified state officers
as' "private individuals." Instead, the court took judicial notice of
the fact that:
While state officers are not agents of the United States, yet
under the cooperative conception of the federal system, they bear
to the Government a much closer relationship than strangers.4 7
In view of the fact that this relationship has produced a high degree
of collaboration,4" the court argued that there was no rational
basis for distinguishing between entrapment by a state or federal
officer. In addition, the court was of the conviction that:
The moral wrong in each instance is equally grave, and each
is equally outside of and contrary to the spirit of the statute de-
fining the federal offense.49
A possible explanation for such a holding is that the court was
aware of the problems that would be created by not extending the
42. Id. at 174.
43. See Brown v. Robbins, 122 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D. Me. 1954) ; Jindra
v. United States, 69 F.2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1934) ; Newman v. United States,
28 F.2d 681, 682 (9th Cir. 1928).
44. See Beard v. United States, 59 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1932) ; Polski v.
United States, 33 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 591 (1929).
45. 33 F.2d 686, 687 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 591 (1929).
46. See, e.g., Brown v. Robbins, 122 F. Supp. 229 (D. Me. 1954).
47. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 1956).
48. See note 68 in fra.
49. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 1956).
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doctrine of entrapment to state officers. Denying the defense of
entrapment would have called attention to the fact that federal
officers could make unofficial agreements with state officers whereby
the state officers would make illegal entrapments and then turn the
defendants over to federal authorities for prosecution. The federal
courts would then be faced with the problem of determining the
extent of federal participation whenever a state officer induced an
accused into committing a federal crime.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DISTINCTIONS
The Fifth Circuit in Henderson v. United States,50 in seeking an
answer to the problem of whether or not the defendant should be
allowed to raise the defense of entrapment when he has been
induced to commit the crime by a state officer, stated that:
The apparent analogy which comes most readily to mind is the
doctrine of the search and seizure cases under which evidence
obtained by an illegal search or seizure by state officers, not made
for the purpose of aiding in the prosecution of a federal offense,
and in which no federal officer has taken any part, is admissible
notwithstanding the illegality of the search or seizure. [cases
omitted] Those cases, however, rest upon reasoning not here
applicable, principally upon disciplinary considerations tending
to practical respect for the Fourth Amendment.,"
The court's reason for distinguishing the search and seizure cases
is far from being clear. The question of whether the considerations
underlying the exclusionary rule in the search and seizure cases are
different from those underlying the defense of entrapment warrants
closer inspection.
Perhaps the most compelling argument for distinguishing be-
tween the federal exclusionary rule and the defense of entrapment
is that the former is a constitutional mandate applicable only to
the federal government while the latter was developed by the courts
as a means of effectuating legislative policy and has no constitutional
foundation.5 2 However, the Wolf and Lustig cases, noted above,5s
do not give strong support to this distinction. On the contrary, the
W'Jolf decision, as interpreted by the concurring opinion, implies
that the federal exclusionary rule is a "judicially created and con-
50. 237 F2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
51. Id. at 175.
52. The basis of the defense of entrapment was announced in Sorrells
v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Apparently neither the majority nor
the minority considered it a constitutional mandate, but the agreement went
no further as to the reason for allowing the defense.
53. See pp. 124-25 supra.
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trolled rule of evidence."" The concurring opinion in Lustig openly
rejects the constitutional foundation argument.
Argluably, then, the federal exclusionary rule should be re-
garded as a tool of the judiciary. As such it implements the fourth
amendment but is not necessarily limited by it. Viewed in this light,
the exclusionary rule is analogous to the defense of entrapment
which implements federal statutes but is by no means bound by them.
Assuming that neither the federal exclusionary rule nor the
doctrine of entrapment derive their existence from the Constitution,
the distinction is advanced that they were developed and are used
to accomplish different purposes. The defense of entrapment is a
device used to ascertain whether a criminal intent was present in
the mind of the accused independent of the solictation of the officer
or whether it was induced by the officer.5 5 On the other hand, the
purpose of the federal exclusionary rule is to control police law-
lessness.5 6
This distinction breaks down upon consideration of a distinc-
tion which the courts have drawn within the area of entrapment
itself. Thus, a court will allow the defense of entrapment when a
federal officer has planted the seeds of crime in the mind of the
accused but will not allow the defense when a private individual
has entrapped the accused. 57 It would seem that criminal intent is
no less present in the mind of the accused simply because a private
individual rather than a federal officer induced the accused to com-
mit the crime. If this last proposition is accepted, then the more
apparent reason for allowing the defense of entrapment is to con-
trol police lawlessness. Therefore, it appears that the exclusionary
rule and the defense of entrapment are indistinguishable in purpose.
54. The Court has given further evidence of this opinion in the recent
case of Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). The Court held that evi-
dence which had been illegally obtained by federal officers must be excluded
in a state court because the officers are bound by Rule 41 (c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule incorporates the federal exclusionary
rule. If the Court had placed their decision on the fourth amendment it could
not have controlled the admission of this evidence in state courts.
As a judicially created and controlled rule of evidence, both the exclu-
sionary rule and the McNabb rule could be extended to state officers under the
Supreme Court's power:
To prescribe from time to time, rules of pleading, practice and procedure
with respect to any or all proceedings prior to and including verdict...
in criminal cases and proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1952).
This power necessarily includes the authority to formulate rules for the
admissibility of evidence in federal courts.
55. See generally, Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal
Courts, 90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245 (1942).
56. See Comment, 58 Yale L. J. 144, 150-52 (1948).
57. See Beard v. United States, 59 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1932).
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A further distinction which has been drawn is that the federal
exclusionary rule, but not the defense of entrapment, raises the
problem of a "double burden." The argument is that there are a
number of state courts which do not exclude illegally obtained
evidence;r 8 therefore, if the federal exclusionary rule is extended
to state officers, the same evidence may be admissible in the state
court but inadmissible in a federal court. If the state officer conducts
a search for evidence of a crime which constitutes both a state and
federal offense, he must comply with both state and federal standards
because of the possibility that the accused may be prosecuted in a
federal court. Therefore the state officer assumes a "double"
burden. In comparison, all but two of the state courts recognize
the defense of entrapment.5 9 Thus, the argument goes, there are no
special problems incurred in extending the defense of entrapment to
state officers as there would be if the federal exclusionary rule were
extended.
This argument assumes too much. It is premised on the assump-
tion that state and federal standards for entrapment are the same.
On the contrary, state courts generally appear to exercise less con-
trol over the conduct of state officers in this area than federal courts
do over federal officers. 0 The result is that the defendant is rarely
successful with the defense of entrapment in a state court where he
might have been in a federal court.8 1 Thus, the problem of a "double
burden" or opposing standards, exists in both search and seizure and
entrapment.
By way of summary, both the federal exclusionary rule and
the defense of entrapment appear to be judicially developed and
controlled means by which a court may restrain police lawlessness.
For purposes of comparison with the law of unreasonable detention,
they will be considered similar in all important respects.
Turning then to the area of unreasonable detention, it has been
seen that the McNabb rule is a judicially created and controlled rule
of evidence. If the argument is accepted that the federal exclusionary
rule is similarly created and controlled, the two rules can be equated.
Neither of the rules is a constitutional mandate and both are used
58. Twenty-seven states, including Minnesota, admit evidence which has
been obtained in an illegal search and seizure. See Note, 35 Minn. L. Rev.
457, 464-65 (1951).
59. The defense is not recognized in New York and Tennessee. See
People v. Schacher, 47 N.Y.S2d 371 (1944) ; People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274,
70 N.E. 786 (1904) ; Goins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1950);
Palmer v. State, 187 Tenn. 527, 216 S.W.2d 25 (1948).
60. See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons
and Agent Provocateurs, 60 Yale L. J. 1091, 1105-06 (1951).
61. Id. at 1106 n.42.
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by the courts to restrain illegal police activity. If the equating
process is accepted up to this point, it becomes a matter of logic
to argue that the McNabb rule can also be equated to the defense
of entrapment.
PROSPECTIVE
Assuming that the areas of illegal search and seizure, unreason-
able detention, and entrapment can-be equated, any significant move
by the federal courts in one area, to extend confrol over state officers,
should apply with equal weight in the others. To date the Supreme
Court has refused to take a definite stand on the problem. For the
present the problem is one for the lower federal courts to resolve.
In this setting the Henderson case could be the impetus for an
extension of the federal exclusionary rule and the McNabb rule to
state officers who aid in the enforcement of federal law. A more
important consideration is whether these rules should be extended.
The argument most frequently advanced for not extending
these rules is that such an extension would create opposing stand-
ards of conduct for state police in those states which do admit
evidence obtained in an illegal search 2 and a confession obtained
during an unreasonable period of detention. These "double" stand-
ards would seriously hamper the efficiency of both federal and state
law enforcement. State officers would have to secure a search
warrant which was sufficient under federal standards and hold the
accused for only a "reasonable" length of time after arrest when-
ever there was a possibility that the accused would be prosecuted in
a federal court. If they later found that no federal crime had been
committed, only a state crime, or the accused is tried in a state rather
than a federal court, the officers would have unnecessarily incum-
bered the enforcement of state law. On the other hand, if they knew
that a federal crime was involved, they might refrain from cooperat-
ing with federal authorities because they would not have enough
evidence to obtain a federal search warrant. Rather they would use
state methods of enforcement and prosecute the matter in state
courts. Such a result would deprive the federal officers of the vital
assistance which they are now receiving from state officers. The
problem of enforcing the difficult areas of federal law, such as the
control of narcotics, would be left entirely to an inadequate number
of federal officers.
However, the opposing arguments on the "double burden"
question seem equally persuasive. Where the state officer knows
62. See note 58 supra and related text.
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that only a federal violation is involved, he is already subject to the
federal exclusionary rule under the Gambino test. 13 The rationale
of Gambino argues equally for extending the McNabb rule to state
officers when only a federal violation is involved. In those cases
where there is only a "possibility" that a federal law has been
violated, there is some doubt as to whether the efficiency of state law
enforcement would in fact be impaired. As a practical matter, state
police should be aware that in areas such as narcotics or illegal
distillation of liquor, federal and state law coincide. 4
Although it cannot be denied that the extension of the federal
exclusionary rule and the McNabb rule would create some con-
fusion in state law enforcement practices, any loss of efficiency
in law enforcement has generally been offset with protection of
the rights of the accused.65 When a state officer makes an illegal
search and seizure or holds the accused for an unreasonable length
of time before presenting him before a magistrate, the accused is a
victim of police lawlessness. If the federal courts make a distinction
between state and federal officers in either of these acts, they are not
administering federal justice with equality. The comments of a
federal district judge on this issue are appropriate:
It seems a sad commentary on justice where an illegal search is
made upon an individual and his property seized as a result
thereof, that such evidence should be admissible in a court
of law .... 66
The "safeguard" of finding federal participation is of little or no
value in diminishing this inequality. The burden is on the defendant
to establish it, show it was directly responsible for the illegal conduct
of the state officers, and that his rights were substantially impaired
63. See p. 123 supra.
64. It is common knowledge that the FBI conducts training schools for
state law enforcement officers. Facts and figures as to how many of these
schools are conducted each year and exactly what is taught are not available.
This information, along with other information on federal-state cooperation
in law enforcement, is classified and cannot be released. However, it seems
likely that state officers attending these schools would become familiar with
federal law and federal law enforcement practices. Thus a state officer prob-
ably knows what crimes are federal offenses and what crimes, which are both
state and federal offenses, the federal government prefers to prosecute in fed-
eral courts.
65. The most quoted remark in support of this proposition is the lan-
guage of Jtustice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1938) :
It is desirable that criminals should be detected . . . [but] we have to
choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.
66. United States v. Suttenberg, 35 F. Supp. 861, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).




by it. This has proven extremely difficult to establish 7 without a
willingness on the part of the police to open their records. How-
ever, it is naivet6 to assume that the police will be willing to co-
operate or that there are no unofficial, unrecorded "working agree-
ments."
Finally, it is important to recognize that the present exceptions
to the federal exclusionary rules were developed in an age when
federal and state law enforcement were distinct operations. These
exceptions are not adaptable to the present high degree of coopera-
tion between federal and state officers recognized by the court of
appeals in the Henderson case. They operate to deprive the accused
of his rights and encourage police lawlessness. 6 These factors do
not present an overwhelming argument for the extention of the
federal exclusionary rule and the McNabb rule. However, they
do argue for a re-examination by the federal courts of their grounds
for refusing to extend those rules.
67. See Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the
Civil Liberties, 45 Ili. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1950).
68. [L]aw enforcement officers have found it increasingly difficult in
recent years to cope with the kind of nation-wide syndicated criminal ac-
tivity that has developed following the two World Wars. Close-knit
organization and the effective use of modem transportation and commu-
nication facilities have enabled big-time racketeers and other criminals
to take greater and greater advantage of the historic jurisdictional lim-
itations on police officers. Law enforcement agencies of every kind, local,
state, and federal, have found it absolutely essential to join together in
a cooperative effort, so far as physically and legally possible, to meet the
challenge. By and large, federal-state cooperation has in recent years
been on a very high level and has proved effective in the suppression of
crime. Such cooperation when carried out on the proper plain is to be
encouraged. Unfortunately there have been instances of failure on the
part of some officers to distinguish between cooperation and collusion -
cooperation for the more effective enforcement of law by legitimate
means, and collusion for the shortcut, "easy" enforcement of law by ille-
gitimate means.
Machen, The Law of Search and Seizure, 125-26 (1950). See also Beisel,
Control Over Illegal Enforcement of Criminal Law; Role of the Supreme
Court, 34 B.U.L. Rev. 413 (1954).
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